Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference

Dialectica 62 (3):323-334 (2008)

Authors
Derek Brown
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Indirect realists maintain that our perceptions of the external world are mediated by our 'perceptions' of subjective intermediaries such as sensations. Multiple reference occurs when a word or an instance of it has more than one reference. I argue that, because indirect realists hold that speakers typically and unknowingly directly perceive something subjective and indirectly perceive something objective, the phenomenon of multiple reference is an important resource for their view. In particular, a challenge that A. D. Smith has recently put forward for indirect realists can be overcome by appreciating how multiple reference is likely to arise when a projectivist variety of indirect realism is interpreted by speakers adhering to a naïve direct realism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01157.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):640-642.

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Citations of this work BETA

Indirect Perceptual Realism and Demonstratives.Derek Henry Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377-394.

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