Noûs 47 (1):179-192 (2013)

Authors
Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined by the practical reasoning situations she is then in to which that particular proposition is relevant. According to the Unity Approach, the threshold for a subject to know any proposition whatsoever at a time is determined by a privileged practical reasoning situation she then faces, most plausibly the highest stakes practical reasoning situation she is then in. I argue that neither way of implementing the impurist strategy succeeds and so impurism does not offer a satisfactory response to the threshold problem
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12008
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,018
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.
Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.
Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-12-28

Total views
177 ( #47,921 of 2,324,058 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #53,443 of 2,324,058 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes