Inconsistency theories of semantic paradox, by Douglas Patterson

Philosopher's Digest (2009)
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Abstract

Douglas Patterson argues that the best way to respond to the semantic paradoxes that arise in natural language is to take natural language semantics to be (explosively) inconsistent. According to Patterson, to understand a natural language is to share with others cognition of a false semantic theory. Patterson’s main argument runs as follows. English is expressively rich. So, the first sentence occurring in this review could be.

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Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

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