Knowability, possibility and paradox

In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan (2008)
Authors
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Joe Salerno
Saint Louis University
Abstract
The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are knowability paradoxes that the restriction does nothing to thwart. We argue that Jon Kvanvig’s strategy, which aims to block the paradox by appealing to the special role of quantified epistemic expressions in modal contexts, has grave errors. We offer here a new proposal founded on Kvanvig’s insight that quantified expressions play a special role in modal contexts. On an articulation of this special role provided by Stanley and Szabo, we propose a solution to the knowability paradoxes. Introduction..
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Defending the Possibility of Knowledge.Neil Kennedy - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):579-601.

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New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
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