Knowability, possibility and paradox
In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan (2008)
Abstract
The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are knowability paradoxes that the restriction does nothing to thwart. We argue that Jon Kvanvig’s strategy, which aims to block the paradox by appealing to the special role of quantified epistemic expressions in modal contexts, has grave errors. We offer here a new proposal founded on Kvanvig’s insight that quantified expressions play a special role in modal contexts. On an articulation of this special role provided by Stanley and Szabo, we propose a solution to the knowability paradoxes. Introduction..Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Defending the Possibility of Knowledge.Neil Kennedy - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):579-601.
The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic.Carlo Proietti - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):87-104.
On keeping blue swans and unknowable facts at bay : a case study on Fitch's paradox.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Eschewing Entities: Outlining a Biology Based Form of Structural Realism.Steven French - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 371--381.