Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409 (2008)
AbstractMoral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds
Similar books and articles
Habermas, Kantian pragmatism, and truth.Steven Levine - 2010 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (6):677-695.
In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.
Contextualism, assessor relativism, and insensitive assessments.Gunnar Björnsson & Alexander Almér - 2009 - Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):363-372.
Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism.Katinka J. P. Quintelier & Daniel M. T. Fessler - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.
Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers' judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Perspective in taste predicates and epistemic modals.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
References found in this work
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.