Multiple personality and personal identity

Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447 (2001)
Abstract
If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated clusters of general event memory and episodic memory. Multiples exhibit erratic behavior because they cannot access reliably the intersecting autobiographical memory schemata that permit graceful transitions between social roles, behavioral repertoire and emotional dispositions. Selves, in both normal and certain pathological cases, are best understood as semi-fictional narratives created by human animals to serve their social, emotional and physical needs
Keywords Epistemology  Personal Identity  Self
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DOI 10.1080/09515080120088102
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Elements of Episodic Memory.Endel Tulving - 1985 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Delusion, Dissociation and Identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
Dissociative Identity Disorder and Ambivalence.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):223-237.

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