Moral sentiments and the justification of punishment

Abstract
Adam Smith's theory of punishment is rarely explored. This article examines his understanding of punishment in light of his theory of moral sentiments. My aim is to show how he is neither a retributivist or deterrence advocate, but instead defends a more unified theory of punishment bringing different penal goals together in a new framework.
Keywords Adam Smith  Smith  punishment  moral sentiments  unified theory of punsihment  retribution
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,856
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Idea of a Justification for Punishment.Kevin Magill - 1998 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
Unintentional Punishment.Adam Kolber - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (1):1-29.
On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism.Noriaki Iwasa - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
Kant's Theory of Punishment.Thom Brooks - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):206.
Punishment and Moral Education.James D. Marshall - 1984 - Journal of Moral Education 13 (2):83-89.
Added to PP index
2009-08-27

Total downloads
66 ( #90,268 of 2,231,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #147,513 of 2,231,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature