Abstract

In my dissertation I consider how far it is possible to found a moral theory in the emotions. I am interested in emotion-based theories because I believe that the foundation sought for morality should show that moral considerations by themselves are capable of motivating agents to act morally. On this view, which recent writers such as Frankena and Nagel classify as internalist, an agent is moved by the thought or perception that something is morally good, right, or worthy. I argue that internalism is more plausible than writers like Frankena claim and that it is superior to externalism which holds that moral motivation is external to morality. Hume's moral theory is viewed as paradigmatically internalist given that he holds that the source of all motivation is some emotion and that he views morality as based in the emotions. I argue that he fails to produce an internalist theory. Hume's theory is character centered but I argue that the emotions and character traits which make a person good remain natural, non-moral feelings. What makes them morally worthy is that they are approved of from the outside--by an impartial observer. In a character centered internalist theory, however, the emotions which make a person good are to be organized and moralized from within. This, however, requires a view of deliberate action and a view about how we may identify with some of our passions. Hume, I argue, fails to adequately account for both notions. I trace Hume's failure to produce an internalist theory to the way in which he characterizes a person's relation to his emotions. On Hume's view, we may either observe the causal patterns in our emotional life or we may use our emotions