Normative epistemology and naturalized epistemology

Abstract
A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least as severe as the purported difficulties for naturalized epistemology. Second, some examples of the ways in which norms are proposed and evaluated in the course of scientific research are considered and it is concluded that science has no need for trans?scientific norms. Finally, the three arguments introduced at the outset have no force when they are viewed in the light of the preceding discussion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201748808602138
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,396
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
In the Tracks of the Historicist Movement: Re-Assessing the Carnap-Kuhn Connection.Guy S. Axtell - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):119-146.
Neurath's Programme for Naturalistic Epistemology.Thomas E. Uebel - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):623-646.
What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism.Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.
Prospective Realism.Harold I. Brown - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):211-242.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-30

Total downloads
76 ( #77,200 of 2,225,993 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #426,905 of 2,225,993 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature