Needs-centered ethical theory

Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):425-434 (2002)
Our aims in this paper are: (1) to indicate some of the many ways in which needs are an important part of the moral landscape, (2) to show that the dominant contemporary moral theories cannot adequately capture the moral significance of needs, indeed, that the dominant theories are inadequate to the extent that they cannot accommodate the insights which attention to needs yield, (3) to offer some sketches that should be helpful to future cartographers charting the domain of morally significant needs, and (4) to consider some anticipated objections to our project and offer some replies.
Keywords needs  ethical theory
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DOI 10.1023/A:1021910832459
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Soran Reader (2006). Does a Basic Needs Approach Need Capabilities? Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3):337–350.

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