Normative requirements

Ratio 12 (4):398–419 (1999)
Authors
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Abstract
Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing normative requirements with reasons
Keywords ought normativity reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00101
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,097
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.

View all 124 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons.Ken O'Day - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
Reason, Reasons and Normativity.Joseph Raz - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
525 ( #5,976 of 2,313,450 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #14,109 of 2,313,450 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature