Ratio 12 (4):398–419 (1999)

Authors
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Abstract
Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing normative requirements with reasons
Keywords ought normativity reasons
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00101
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References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
Imperatives and Logic.Alf Ross - 1944 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):48-48.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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