Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110 (2007)
In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockham’s account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mind—specifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself.
Keywords Ockham  Intentionality  Concepts  propositional attitudes  scientia  demonstration
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0008
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Susan Brower-Toland, Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Victor Caston (1998). Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):249-298.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). 1991. In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview
John Boler (2003). Ockham on the Concept. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (1):65-86.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

148 ( #28,568 of 1,902,964 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

23 ( #22,969 of 1,902,964 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.