Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113 (2006)
A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts with Peacocke’s multi-referent view, according to which such abnormal cases force us to introduce a wholly distinct kind of colour experience. I also argue that the two uses of colour names, arising from their two referents, have different extensions, even in normal perceptual circumstances, a consequence which conflicts with the heart of Rosenthal’s dual referent view.
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Perception Referent Peacocke, Christopher Rosenthal, David|
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References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Colour: A Case for Conceptual Fission.J. Barry Maund - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (September):308-22.
The Phenomenal and Other Uses of 'Looks'.J. Barry Maund - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (June):170-180.
Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account.Mario Gómez‐Torrente - 2014 - Noûs 49 (3):3-40.
Indirect Perceptual Realism and Demonstratives.Derek Henry Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377-394.
Indirect Perceptual Realism and Multiple Reference.Derek Brown - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (3):323-334.
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