Projectivism and phenomenal presence

In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 226-251 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Projectivism is the thesis that we project at least some subjective aspects of perception into what we experience as the world outside ourselves. It is familiar from various phantom pains, afterimages, and hallucinations. Strong Projectivism asserts that all perceptual experiences involve and only involve direct awareness of projected elements. Strong Projectivism is an unpopular and I argue underappreciated variety of intentionalism (or representationalism). It straightforwardly explains the transparency of experience (section 2) and phenomena qualia theorists offer to avoid intentionalism such as blurry vision and spectrum inversion (section 3). Finally, projectivism illuminates residual qualia-friendly cases involving imagination and emotion (section 4). Ultimately, instances of non-projected, non-intentional aspects of experience are hard to identify. Thus, the notion of phenomenal presence drawn from projectivism does justice to a great many of the forces at play in debates surrounding qualia and intentionalism. We should bound toward Strong Projectivism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Projectivism and phenomenal presence.Derek H. Brown - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?Richard Joyce - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
Phenomenal projection.Zoltan Jakab - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates.Derek H. Brown - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1):247-270.
Color objectivism and color projectivism.Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.
Qualia, Introspection, and Transparency.Renee Janelle Smith - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
Projectivism without error.Andy Egan - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-10-20

Downloads
386 (#74,701)

6 months
120 (#45,743)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Derek H. Brown
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

View all 20 references / Add more references