The Monist 83 (3):341-356 (2000)
Four-dimensionalism is the thesis that everyday objects, such as you and me, are space-time worms that persist through time by having temporal parts none of which is identical to the object itself. Objects are aggregates or sums of such temporal parts. The main virtue of fourdimensionalism is that it solves—or does away with—the problem of identity through change.1 The main charge raised against it is that it is inconsistent with the thesis according to which there is change in the world.2 If this charge could be sustained, then we would need compelling arguments in support of the view that things are four-dimensional, since the view that there is no change in the world conflicts with so many of our most well-supported common-sense beliefs. In what follows, however, I want to show that, contrary to what is usually believed, fourdimensionalism does not entail a changeless world.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science|
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Citations of this work BETA
The A-Theory of Time, the B-Theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401–457.
Photographic Representation and Depiction of Temporal Extension.Jiri Benovsky - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):194-213.
On Stages, Worms, and Relativity.Yuri Balashov - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:223-.
What Do Four-Dimensionalism and Three-Dimensionalism Disagree About?Ikuro Suzuki - 2017 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 44 (1-2):15-33.
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