Disputatio 13 (60):27-50 (2021)

Authors
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Abstract
This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.
Keywords akrasia  associative duties  close relationships  duties of love  friendship  loving relationship  moral duties  practical identity  romantic love  special relationship obligations  voluntarism
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2021-0002
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References found in this work BETA

After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1983 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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