Humana Mente 10 (32):179-194 (2017)

Authors
Bryson Brown
University of Lethbridge
Abstract
Scientific inquiry is typically focused on particular questions about particular objects and properties. This leads to a multiplicity of models which, even when they draw on a single, consistent body of concepts and principles, often employ different methods and assumptions to model different systems. Pluralists have remarked on how scientists draw on different assumptions to model different systems, different aspects of systems and systems under different conditions and defended the value of distinct, incompatible models within science at any given time. Paraconsistentists have proposed logical strategies to avoid trivialization when inconsistencies arise by a variety of means. Here we examine how chunk and permeate, a simple approach to paraconsistent reasoning which avoids heterodox logic by confining commitments to separate contexts in which reasoning with them is taken to be reliable while allowing ‘permeation’ of some conclusions into other contexts, can help to systematize pluralistic reasoning across the boundaries of plural contexts, using regional climate models as an example. The result is a kind of unity for science—but a unity achieved by the constrained exchange of specified information between different contexts, rather than the closure of all commitments under some paraconsistent consequence relation.
Keywords inconsistence  scientific pluralism  paraconsistency
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017, 2018
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,514
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Scientific Image.Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis.Martin Vezer - 2016 - Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis MA Vezér Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 56:95-102.
Bioethics in Pluralistic Societies.Leigh Turner - 2004 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 7 (2):201-208.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-10-12

Total views
28 ( #354,998 of 2,348,275 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #510,851 of 2,348,275 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes