Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism

Episteme 9 (1):1-20 (2012)
Authors
Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
In this paper, I focus on the most important form of argument for anti-intellectualism, one that exploits alleged connections between knowledge and practical reasoning. I first focus on a form of this argument which exploits a universal principle, Sufficiency, connecting knowledge and practical reasoning. In the face of putative counterexamples to Sufficiency, a number of authors have attempted to reformulate the argument with a weaker principle. However, I argue that the weaker principles suggested are also problematic. I conclude that, so far, there is no good argument for anti-intellectualism that rests on connections between knowledge and practical reasoning.
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2011.4
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.
Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.

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