Authors
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Abstract
Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00022
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