Authors
Alex Broadbent
University of Johannesburg
Abstract
The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting-point the suggestion that C causes E iff (C E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (E C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre-emption. It is found that the 'reversed' counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre-emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.
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DOI 10.1080/09672550701383418
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

When Good Things Happen to Harmed People.Molly Gardner - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):893-908.
Beneficence and Procreation.Molly Gardner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
Structural Properties Revisited.Alexander Bird - 2009 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press. pp. 215--41.
Causes of Causes.Alex Broadbent - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
Inference to the Best Explanation and Mechanisms in Medicine.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (3):211-232.

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