Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1):71 (1983)
I will, in this paper, set out the philosophical foundations and the basic structure of a new theory of justice. I will argue that both these foundations and the theory which is based upon them are intuitively attractive and theoretically sound. Finally, I will argue that both are supported by the fact that they lead to attractive implications such as the following: One can justify at least some governmental redistributive programs which presuppose that those receiving the wealth have a right to it, without being committed to any form of egalitarianism. The justification for these redistributive programs respects property entitlements; it argues, in effect, that property entitlements and rights to some redistribution of wealth presuppose each other, rather than being in conflict with each other. The amount of redistribution to which each indigent person is entitled is directly proportional to the wealth of the society in question and inversely proportional to the number of indigents in the society in question. There are at this stage in the history of Western thought few entirely new ideas in philosophy. Too much has been written about the important issues to allow for entirely new approaches. My theory is no exception to these generalizations, for it draws upon the tradition of John Locke, of the agrarian reforms such as Paine, Spence, and Ogilvie, and of libertarian writers such as Robert Nozick. Nevertheless, I will argue, the resulting theory is a significant advance over the ideas of these earlier writers
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Comment on Brody “Redistribution Without Egalitarianism”.David Friedman - 1983 - Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1):88.
Egalitarianism and Welfare-State Redistribution.Daniel Shapiro - 2002 - Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (1):1-35.
Relocating the Responsibility Cut: Should More Responsibility Imply Less Redistribution?Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden - 2006 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (3):353-362.
"It Shouldn't Have to Be a Trade": Recognition and Redistribution in Care Work Advocacy.Cameron Lynne Macdonald & David A. Merrill - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (2):67-83.
Egalitarianism Reconsidered.Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism?Karsten Klint Jensen - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.
On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism.Martin E. Sandbu - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (3):283-312.
Added to index2010-08-31
Total downloads36 ( #141,124 of 2,158,126 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #198,258 of 2,158,126 )
How can I increase my downloads?