Skepticism and the Cartesian Circle

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):593 - 615 (1984)
I argue that descartes thinks he can be metaphysically certain about each premise in the argument for god's existence, Even before he draws the argument's final conclusion that all his distinct ideas are metaphysically certain. The certainty of the personal premises is secured in the second meditation. The certainty of the causal premises, I argue, Arises from their central role in generating reasons for doubt of the kind that interest descartes
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1984.10716399
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Morris Lipson (1989). Psychological Doubt and the Cartesian Circle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):225 - 246.

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