Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning
Noûs 42 (2):167-189 (2008)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
No Abstract
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x |
| Options |
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.
View all 18 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.
Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
View all 77 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism.Tim Black - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 8--27.
Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.
The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
372 ( #16,985 of 2,309,223 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #34,858 of 2,309,223 )
2009-01-28
Total views
372 ( #16,985 of 2,309,223 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #34,858 of 2,309,223 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
