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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Noûs 42 (2):167-189 (2008) Copy BIBT_EX

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University of St. Andrews

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Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism in Epistemology

Practical and Theoretical Reasoning in Philosophy of Action

Pragmatic and Moral Encroachment in Epistemology

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10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x

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Author's Profile

University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.

How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.

The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

View all 19 references / Add more references