Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Noûs 42 (2):167-189 (2008)

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Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Warrant and Action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.
Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.

View all 77 citations / Add more citations

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Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism.Tim Black - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 8--27.
Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
Knowledge, Speaker and Subject.Stewart Cohen - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212.
The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
Knowledge and Practical Reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.

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