Two conceptions of access-consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):147-147 (1997)
Abstract
Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X97230050
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