The composition of reasons

Synthese 191 (5) (2014)
Abstract
How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons. Two of these views I call “Atomism” and “Wholism”. Atomism is the view that atomic reasons are fundamental: all reasons reduce to atomic reasons. Wholism is the view that whole reasons are fundamental. I argue for Wholism, and against Atomism. I also consider whether reasons might be “context-sensitive”
Keywords Reasons  Mereology  Atomism  Wholism  Additivism   Marginalism  Isolationism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0299-8
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Plural Predication.Thomas J. McKay - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Evidentialism and the Numbers Game.Andrew Reisner - 2007 - Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Animal Action in the Space of Reasons.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.
Reasons and Impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Two Kinds of Holism About Values.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.
Ethics Without Reasons?Roger Crisp - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-05-01

Total downloads

378 ( #7,155 of 2,178,112 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

50 ( #4,270 of 2,178,112 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums