The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access

Analysis 55 (3):149-56 (1995)
Abstract
In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use Burge's commitment to these entailments to show that his antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access
Keywords Dependence  Epistemology  Individualism  Mckinsey, M
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DOI 10.1093/analys/55.3.149
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McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'.Keith DeRose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
Privileged Access to the World.Sarah Sawyer - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.
The Discrimination Argument Revisited.Simon Dierig - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):73-92.

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