The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press (2008)

Authors
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Abstract
Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible ways to refute it. I will then argue that two of these are unsuccessful, and defend the third, which involves denying that there are any genuinely relative truths.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,160
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism.Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:193-207.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
403 ( #24,163 of 2,499,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,166 of 2,499,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes