The Value of a Person


Authors
John Broome
University Of Oxford
Adam Morton
University of British Columbia
Abstract
(for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.
Keywords person  repugnant conclusion  beterness relation
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DOI 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/68.1.167
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A Consequentialist Account of Narveson’s Dictum.John Cusbert & Robyn Kath - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1693-1709.
Prioritarianism for Variable Populations.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):325-361.

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