Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839 (2013)
Abstract
Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.
Keywords values in science  inductive risk  underdetermination
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DOI 10.1086/673720
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References found in this work BETA
Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
A New Direction for Science and Values.Dan Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
Evidence: Wanted, Alive or Dead.Stathis Psillos - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):357-381.

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