Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839 (2013)

Authors
Matthew J. Brown
University of Texas at Dallas
Abstract
Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.
Keywords values in science  inductive risk  underdetermination
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Reprint years 2012, 2013
DOI 10.1086/673720
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References found in this work BETA

The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Direction for Science and Values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?Anna Alexandrova - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):421-445.

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