Verdad y explicación

Theoria 7 (1/2/3):1161-1181 (1992)
Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the predicate “truth” in some of the most relevant contexts of science and daily life
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DOI theoria199271/2/366
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