Authors
Abstract
Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the predicate “truth” in some of the most relevant contexts of science and daily life.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria199271/2/366
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,410
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deflationism and the Success Argument.By Nic Damnjanovic - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
Truth and Explanation.Jerry Steven Kapus - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Un examen de la argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad.Luis Fernandez Moreno - 1996 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (3):165-176.
Truth, Explanation, Minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.
Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-Aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson.Carlos Caorsi - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (2):263-276.
Articulating the Aims of Science.Nicholas Maxwell - 1977 - Nature 265 (January 6):2.
John Dewey. Una Perspectiva de Su Concepción de la Verdad.Ronald Teliz - 2007 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 19 (2):241-264.
La noción kantiana de verdad trascendental.Stéfano Straulino - 2016 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1 (2):126-145.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-01-09

Total views
60 ( #161,327 of 2,371,808 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #557,530 of 2,371,808 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes