Why counterpossibles are non-trivial

In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), Synthese volume (2007)
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Abstract

I. Non-Trivial Counterpossibles On Lewis’ account, a subjunctive of the form ‘if it were the case that p, it would be the case that q’ (represented as ‘p → q’) is to be given the following rough meta-linguistic truth-conditions1.

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Author Profiles

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Joe Salerno
Saint Louis University

Citations of this work

Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.
Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013):en ligne.
Omission impossible.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589.
Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice.Fabio Lampert & Pedro Merlussi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):445-469.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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