Oxford University Press (2004)
We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives of the future people who will be killed by the global warming we cause, through violent weather, tropical disease, and heat waves. We also make choices that affect how many lives there will be in the future: as individuals we choose how many children to have, and societies choose tax policies that influence people's choices about having children. These are all problems of weighing lives. How should we weigh lives? Weighing Lives develops a theoretical basis for answering this practical question. It extends the work and methods of Broome's earlier book Weighing Goods to cover the questions of life and death. Difficult problems come up in the process. In particular, Weighing Lives tackles the well-recognized, awkward problems of the ethics of population. It carefully examines the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral - neither a good nor a bad thing - but eventually concludes this intuition cannot be fitted into a coherent theory of value. In the course of its argument, Weighing Lives examines many of the issues of contemporary moral theory: the nature of consequentialism and teleology; the transitivity, continuity, and vagueness of betterness; the quantitative conception of wellbeing; the notion of a life worth living; the badness of death; and others. This is a work of philosophy, but one of its distinctive features is that it adopts some of the precise methods of economic theory (without introducing complex mathematics). Not only philosophers, but also economists and political theorists concerned with the practical question of valuing life, should find the book's conclusions highly significant to their work.
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|Reprint years||2005, 2006|
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|Call number||BJ1012.B72 2004|
|ISBN(s)||0199297703 019924376X 9780199243761 9780199297702|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than.Jacob M. Nebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2).
Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
Incommensurability and Vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness.Toby Handfield - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):584-604.
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Broome on Moral Goodness and Population Ethics.Peter Vallentyne - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):739 - 746.
More Lives, Better Lives.Christopher Belshaw - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):127-141.
Book Review: Weighing Lives. [REVIEW]Nils Holtug - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):115-118.
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