What's So Unobservable about Causation?


Authors
Richard Brown
LaGuardia Community College (CUNY)
Abstract
Written in 2002/2003 while I was a graduate student at the University of Connecticut and ultimately submitted as part of my qualifying exam for the Master Degree in philosophy. I argue that the causal relation is observable even if the necessity of the connection is not. This version (the only one that remains) was prepared for presentation at the New Jersey Regional Philosophy Association
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