Zombies and Simulation

Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (7-8):21-25 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his engaging and important paper David Chalmers argues that perhaps the best way to navigate the singularity is for us to integrate with the AI++ agents. One way we might be able to do that is via uploading, which is a process in which we create an exact digital duplicate of our brain. He argues that consciousness is an organizational invariant, which means that a simulation of that property would count as the real thing (a simulation of a computer is a computer, and so being a computer is an organizational invariant). If this is the case then we can rest assured that we will retain our consciousness inside such a simulation. In this commentary I will explore these ideas and their relation to philosophical zombies. I will argue that dualism could be true of the zombie world and that the conclusion of the standard zombie argument needs to be modified to deal with simulation. In short I argue that if one endorses biologism about consciousness then the conceivability of zombies is irrelevant to the physicalism/dualism debate

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,826

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-15

Downloads
137 (#99,811)

6 months
6 (#144,992)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Brown
LaGuardia Community College (CUNY)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references