How to resolve doxastic disagreement

Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381 (2014)

Authors
Anna-Maria A. Eder
University of Cologne
Peter Brössel
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Abstract
How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement
Keywords Bayesian epistemology  epistemic disagreement  probability aggregation  social epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0431-4
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References found in this work BETA

In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Socratic Method, Defeasibility, and Doxastic Responsibility.Peter Boghossian & James Lindsay - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (3):244-253.

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