Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397 (2013)

Peter Brössel
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure sensitivity" has for Bayesian confirmation theory and discusses whether it points at pluralism about notions of confirmation.
Keywords Bayesian Epistemology  Confirmation Theory  Measure Sensitivity
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1086/671172
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References found in this work BETA

Measuring Confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dwindling Confirmation.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):114-137.
State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.

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