Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality

Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325 (2009)
Abstract
Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism faces significant difficulties. I proceed by considering two attempts by Cognitivists to explain requirements of practical rationality and I argue that neither of them succeed
Keywords Practical rationality  Theoretical rationality  Cognitivism  Intention  Belief  Instrumental rationality  Consistency  Setiya
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9267-4
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why Cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.

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