A note on theories for quasi-inductive definitions

Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):684-699 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper introduces theories for arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (Burgess, 1986) as it has been done for first-order monotone and nonmonotone inductive ones. After displaying the basic axiomatic framework, we provide some initial result in the proof theoretic bounds line of research (the upper one being given in terms of a theory of sets extending Kripke–Platek set theory)



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,878

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

40 (#315,908)

6 months
1 (#501,187)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
Elementary Induction on Abstract Structures.Wayne Richter - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (1):124-125.

View all 12 references / Add more references