Dialogue 53 (4):715-735 (2014)

G. Anthony Bruno
Royal Holloway University of London
It is commonly held that nature is knowable in itself and that death has no explanatory priority in knowing nature. I reject both claims as they undermine an account of the unity of human life, failing, respectively, to thematize the limitations of finite understanding and to acknowledge what’s most certain about finite existence. I use Kant’s idea of the thing in itself and Heidegger’s idea of death to solve two structurally analogous antinomies these failures leave intact. I conclude that to think these ideas is to represent the telos that unifies our living as, respectively, finite knowers and finite beings.
Keywords thing in itself  death  antinomy  Kant  Heidegger
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1017/s0012217314000390
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References found in this work BETA

Being and Time.Ronald W. Hepburn - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):276.
Negative Dialectics.Raymond Geuss - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (6):167-175.
The Absurd.Thomas Nagel - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (20):716-727.
The World as Will and Representation.Lewis White Beck - 1959 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (2):279-280.

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