Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism

Analysis 61 (3):187-193 (2001)
Abstract
In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind  Possibility  Chalmers, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00293
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,755
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism.Anand Vaidya - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):191-212.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Argument for Dualism.Andrew Melnyk - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 331-349.
Conceiving What is Not There.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Zombies Begone! Against Chalmers' Mind/Brain Dualism.Wallace I. Matson - 2003 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 (1):123-136.
Redundancy of the Zombie Argument in The Conscious Mind.Antti Heikinheimo - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2002 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
Vs. A New a Priorist Argument for Dualism.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):130-47.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
494 ( #5,332 of 2,263,134 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #16,687 of 2,263,134 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature