Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism

Analysis 61 (3):187-193 (2001)
Abstract
In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind  Possibility  Chalmers, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00293
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism.Anand Vaidya - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):191-212.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Argument for Dualism.Andrew Melnyk - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 331-349.
Conceiving What is Not There.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Zombies Begone! Against Chalmers' Mind/Brain Dualism.Wallace I. Matson - 2003 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 (1):123-136.
Redundancy of the Zombie Argument in The Conscious Mind.Antti Heikinheimo - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2002 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
Vs. A New a Priorist Argument for Dualism.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):130-47.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
451 ( #5,009 of 2,191,856 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #27,617 of 2,191,856 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature