Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism

Analysis 61 (3):187-193 (2001)
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Abstract

In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt

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