Content externalism and a priori knowledge
Protosociology 11:149-159 (1998)
M. McKinsey has argued that the externalist theory of mental content implies that one can have a priori knowledge of propositions that are in fact only knowable a posteriori. So, according to McKinsey, the externalist theory must be mistaken. A. Gallois and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne have formalized this argument. In this paper, I discuss their formalization and their criticisms of it
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Externalism Gallois, A Mckinsey, M O'leary-hawthorne, J|
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