Contextualism, Hawthorne's invariantism and third-person cases

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):315–318 (2005)

Abstract
Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00400.x
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References found in this work BETA

Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.
Knowledge Claims and Context: Belief.Wayne A. Davis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):399-432.
Factivity and Contextualism.Peter Baumann - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):82-89.

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