In defense of adaptive preferences

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324 (2009)
Abstract
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
Keywords Rational choice  Preferences  Adaptive preferences  Sour grapes  Elster  Bovens
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9188-7
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.

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Citations of this work BETA
Disability and Adaptive Preference.Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):1-22.
Ending Life, Morality, and Meaning.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):559-574.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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