Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324 (2009)
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
|Keywords||Rational choice Preferences Adaptive preferences Sour grapes Elster Bovens|
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.Connie S. Rosati - 1995 - Ethics 105 (2):296-325.
Citations of this work BETA
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Authenticity and Psychiatric Disorder: Does Autonomy of Personal Preferences Matter? [REVIEW]Manne Sjöstrand & Niklas Juth - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1):115-122.
Niche Construction, Adaptive Preferences, and the Differences Between Fitness and Utility.Armin W. Schulz - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):315-335.
Ending Life, Morality, and Meaning.Jukka Varelius - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):559-574.
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