If I am a brain in a vat, then I am not a brain in a vat

Mind 101 (401):123-128 (1992)
Abstract
Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/101.401.123
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Externalism and Skepticism.Keith Butler - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.
Externalism and Scepticism.Keith Butler - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.

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