Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140 (2012)
Authors
John Brunero
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements
Keywords Instrumental rationality  Rational requirements  Symmetry  Wide-scope  Narrow-scope
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9622-0
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.
Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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