Over de kloof tussen zijn en behoren in kelsens normentheorie

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (3):461 - 481 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines the import of the is-ought dichotomy in Kelsen's theory of norms. The argument starts with the thesis that the separation of is and ought as a logical criterion for the scientific theory of norms requires not only that ‘norms are not to be derived from facts’, but also that ‘facts are not to be derived from norms’. Kelsen’s reasoning to meet the first condition is explained by an analysis of his critique on the ontologico-ethical justification of norms. Kelsen’s alternative, formal justification via the concept of the basic norm is presented and evaluated. The way in which Kelsen meets the second condition of the criterion is shown in an analysis of his critique on the common sense conception of the practical meaning of norms. Kelsen’s alternative interpretation via the concept of the modally indifferent substratum is explained and questioned. The argument enables to conclude that, contrary to the received view, Kelsen’s theory of norms does not reflect moral relativism but unmitigated moral scepticism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-30

Downloads
14 (#846,877)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references