Predictivism and the periodic table

This is a comment on the paper by Barnes and the responses from Scerri and Worrall , debating the thesis that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers of science employ, rather I describe how scientists themselves use facts and predictions to support their theories. I find wide variations, and no support for the assumption that scientists use a single ‘Scientific Method’ in deciding whether to accept a proposed new theory.Keywords: Predictivism; Novel predictions; Accommodation; Periodic law; Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.007
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References found in this work BETA
Eric Scerri & John Worrall (2001). Prediction and the Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32 (3):407-452.
John Worrall (2005). Prediction and the 'Periodic Law': A Rejoinder to Barnes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):817-826.
Eric Barnes (2005). On Mendeleev's Predictions: Comment on Scerri and Worrall. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):801-812.
Eric R. Scerri (2005). Response to Barnes's Critique of Scerri and Worrall. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):813-816.

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Citations of this work BETA
Heather Douglas & P. D. Magnus (2013). State of the Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):580-589.

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Similar books and articles
Eric R. Scerri (2005). On the Formalization of the Periodic Table. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):191-210.
E. C. Barnes (2005). Predictivism for Pluralists. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Eric Barnes (1996). Social Predictivism. Erkenntnis 45 (1):69 - 89.
Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.

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