Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration

In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New York, USA: Oxford University Press (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in such situations by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner is disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration.

Similar books and articles

Explaining fairness in complex environments.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):81-97.
Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution.Christopher D. Proulx - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment.Daniel Cardona-Coll - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (4):357-374.
Delay in a bargaining game with contracts.Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (4):339-353.
A Note on Implementation of Bargaining Solutions.Yusuke Samejima - 2005 - Theory and Decision 59 (3):175-191.
Bargaining and Justice.David Gauthier - 1985 - Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (2):29.
Rational Cooperation and the Nash Bargaining Solution.Michael Moehler - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):577-594.
Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.


Added to PP

624 (#27,916)

6 months
107 (#39,723)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin Bruner
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

What's the Point of Authors?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Divergence of values and goals in participatory research.Lucas Dunlap, Amanda Corris, Melissa Jacquart, Zvi Biener & Angela Potochnik - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C):284-291.
When journal editors play favorites.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):831-858.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
Ethics in psychology: professional standards and cases.Gerald P. Koocher - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Patricia Keith-Spiegel.

View all 14 references / Add more references