In T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge (2016)

Authors
Justin Bruner
University of Arizona
Cailin O'Connor
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in such situations by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner is disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration.
Keywords power  bargaining  collaboration  nash demand game  evolutionary game theory  academia  social epistemology
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References found in this work BETA

Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.

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Citations of this work BETA

When Journal Editors Play Favorites.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):831-858.
What's the Point of Authors?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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