Parfit on what matters in survival
Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22 (1993)
Abstract
Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.DOI
10.1007/bf00989659
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Citations of this work
The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750.
Animalism, dicephalus, and borderline cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
