Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22 (1993)
Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
|Keywords||Epistemology Identity Indeterminacy Language Parfit, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.
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